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A new objection to representationalist direct realism  
Abstract 
Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late 
twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist 
objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments 
from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when 
fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within 
cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist 
heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust 
argument against representationalist direct realism which does not rest on illusory cases or 
the notion of an object of immediate awareness. None of the representations so far posited, or 
in prospect, can supply the content required of a representation in a direct realist theory of 
veridical perception.  
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A new argument against representationalist direct realism 
Introduction 
Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late 
twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist 
objection to the Phenomenal Principle  might provide an effective response to the arguments 
from illusion and hallucination (Fish, 2010, p. 65), plausible representationalist theories of 
perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-
claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-
representationalist heterodoxy. (Chemero, 2009) Drawing on both the philosophy and 
cognitive science1 we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism 
which does not rest on illusory cases or the notion of an object of immediate awareness.  
First, we need to clarify potentially confusing terminology. Within the literature, 
“representationalism” and its cognates are used in two conflicting senses: representationalist 
direct realism (Crane & French, 2017, p. 28) and Lockean indirect realism (Armstrong, 
1961). We use the term exclusively in the first sense, taking “representationalist” and 
“intentionalist” to be synonymous. It is in this sense that Aydede can say that “strong 
representationalism is the modern day's direct realism” (2019, p. 35). We also use 
“representationalist” to refer to arguments defending direct realism by rejecting the 
Phenomenal Principle (Fish, 2010, p. 65). Thus we might say that the representionalist 
objection is used to defend representationalist direct realism against the argument from 
illusion. Direct realism can be presented as a theory about the metaphysics or epistemology 
of perception. 2 We are concerned with the former. 4 
The paper is structured as follows: 
1. We write the “job description”3 for a representation within A a direct realist theory of 
perception, and B an explanation of perceptually guided behaviour.   
2. Drawing on the cognitive science, we examine the candidate representations that have 
been widely discussed in the literature.  
3. We grant that these representations provide the basis for “surrogate reasoning” 
(Swoyer, 1991) about their targets and thereby meet the requirements of Role B.  
 
1 Although it is useful to differentiate in terms of the approach and focus of attention, we do not draw a hard and 
fast distinction between the science and philosophy of perception. Indeed we would argue for “scientifically 
savvy philosophy”, or “philosophically sophisticated science”, call it what you may. 
 
2 Two types of issue arise in the philosophy of perception, metaphysical and epistemological, which give rise to 
two questions: (i) What is the direct or immediate object of awareness when we perceive? and (ii) How can 
perception give us knowledge of the external world?  See the two Stanford Encyclopedia entries on the problem 
of perception: The Problem of Perception (Crane & French, 2017) and Epistemological Problems of Perception 
(Bonjour, 2017). 
 
3 We take the idea of a “job description” from Ramsey (Representation Reconsidered, 2007), but develop it in a 
different direction. 
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4. However, we argue that these representations cannot meet the requirements of Role 
A. They are “second-order isomorphic” (Shepard & Chipman, 1970) to their targets 
and, as such, cannot supply the representational content needed to satisfy direct 
realism’s directness-claim4.   
5. We address potential objections and consolidate our argument against 
representationalist direct realism. 
1 The role of representations in a direct realist theory of perception 
Any representationalist theory of perception needs to address two issues: Issue 1 the 
relationship between the world and the representation thereof, and Issue 2 the relationship 
between the representation and the phenomenology of perception. Moreover, a direct realist 
theory of perception needs to address both issues in a way which is compatible with direct 
realism’s directness-claim. 
The representationalist theory of consciousness addresses Issue 2 in a manner which, its 
proponents maintain, provides both a defense of direct realism against the arguments from 
illusion and hallucination, and an accommodation of qualia within a materialist theory of 
mind. (Lycan, 2015)  Many variants of the representationalist theory of consciousness have 
been discussed in the recent literature5, but they agree on the essential point that the 
phenomenal character of our experiences is determined by their representational content. Tye 
defines “Strong” and “Weak” Representationalism in terms of identity and supervenience 
respectively: 
Strong Representationalism: phenomenal character is one and the same as 
representational content that meets certain further conditions.  
Weak Representationalism: phenomenal character supervenes on representational 
content that meets certain further conditions…. (2009, p. 256) 
For the purpose of this paper we will grant that Strong Representationalism is true and that 
the “certain further conditions” are met. By being, in this respect, charitable to the 
representationalists we can put aside Issue 2 and all matters concerning the genesis and nature 
of phenomenal experience. Here we focus on Issue 1, the relationship between the world and 
the representation thereof, which has received relatively little attention in the discussion of 
representationalist direct realism. 
Strong Representationalism does not, on its own, constitute a direct realist theory of 
perception. Representationalist direct realism requires a representationalist theory of 
 
4 We will use Dretske’s definition of direct realism (1995). See §1. 
 
5 They include: natural and conventional (Dretske, Naturalising the Mind, 1997) intermodal and intramodal, and 
restricted and unrestricted (Byrne, 2001); realist and anti-realist, content-based and vehicle based, and 
ontologically liberal and conservative (Thompson, 2008); strong and weak, and reductive and non-reductive 
(Tye, Representational Theories of Consciousness, 2009); and narrow and wide (Lycan, 2015).  
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consciousness, plus a representation able to supply the necessary representational content. 
Provisionally, we can outline the job description of such a representation as: 
Job Description Role A (provisional): To supply the representational content needed to 
meet the requirements of the representionalist version of direct realism 
However, we need to distinguish Role A from the more usual role of representations in 
cognitive science: that is in explaining perceptually guided behaviour. The job description for 
representations in this second role can be outlined as: 
Job Description Role B: To supply the representational content needed to explain 
perceptually guided behaviour 
The distinction between the two roles must be emphasized. The requirement for a 
representation in Role B is to provide the basis for an explanation of behaviour, that is 
behaviour that could be studied by a third party, say an experimental psychologist or 
roboticist. Such an explanation is concerned purely with the efficacy of the perceptual 
process and makes no reference to perceptual experience.  
In contrast, the requirement for representations in Role A is to supply the representational 
content necessary to account for the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. Fish 
describes well just how demanding this requirement will be: 
[Since] the representationalist insists that what it is like to have an experience is 
explained by its representational content, an adequate theory of content must ascribe 
contents to experience that are as rich and detailed as that experience’s 
phenomenology. (2010, p. 78)               
Moreover, in Role A, a representation must be able to supply representational content such 
that the perceptual experience is not only sufficiently rich and detailed, but is also in 
accordance with direct realism’s directness-claim. This claim can be expressed in a number 
of forms, but for our present purposes, that is a critique of representationalist direct realism, it 
is desirable to use a form of words that has the imprimatur of the representationalist camp6. 
To this end we draw on Dretske’s reference to “direct realism” 7 in the Oxford Companion to 
Philosophy:           
 
6 To this end we avoid definitions in terms of an “immediate object of awareness”, as in Smith (2002, p. 7), 
which might fall foul of the representationalists’ rejection of the Phenomenal Principle. (Fish, 2010, p. 6) 
 
7 Here Dretske takes the terms “direct realism” and “naïve realism” to be synonymous: reference to the former 
directs the reader to the entry on the latter. Elsewhere, confusingly, “naïve realism” is used as thoroughgoing 
version of “direct realism” which is associated with disjunctivism (Martin, 2004), and to distinguish between 
“naïve” and “scientific” realism (Dancy, 1985, p. 147).  
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A theory of perception that holds that our ordinary perception of physical objects is 
direct, unmediated by awareness of subjective entities, and that, in normal perceptual 
conditions these objects have the properties they appear to have. (1995, p. 602) 
The directness-claim has both a negative and positive component. Negatively, the claim is 
that there are no perceptual intermediaries. Positively, the claim is that in veridical perception 
“objects have the properties that they appear to have”.8 With regard to the negative 
component, we will grant that the role of the representation in the perceptual process is such 
that it (the representation) does not constitute a perceptual intermediary. Otherwise, 
representationalist direct realism does not get off the ground. We focus our critique on the 
positive component which places a particular requirement on representational content.  On 
this basis we can refine our provisional job description for a representation in Role A as: 
Job Description Role A: To supply, in normal perceptual conditions, representational 
content which represents objects as having the properties that they (the objects) actually 
have. 
Implicit in both Dretske’s definition of direct realism and our refined Role A job description, 
is the assumption that objects have certain determinate properties independently of our 
perception of them (the objects). This is the realism-claim which is common to direct and 
indirect realism.9 However, Role A relates specifically to direct realism which places a 
particularly onerous requirement on how the properties of objects are represented. It requires 
that, in normal perceptual conditions,  the representational content represents objects as 
having the properties that they (the objects) actually have, rather than, as would be sufficient 
for indirect realism (and Role B as discussed below), as having properties which in some 
sense correspond10 to the properties that the objects actually have.  
We recognise that, despite our efforts to be fair to their position, direct realists might still 
object to the way the requirements on representational content are specified in our job 
description for Role A. However, talk in terms of job descriptions serves to focus attention on 
the fact that there is a requirement which it may or may not be possible to meet; only a 
detailed examination of the candidate representations, as in the following sections, will tell. 
Moreover, we will argue in §5 that the constraints on representational content are such that 
 
8 This claim about properties is, of course, not peculiar to representationalist direct realism.  For example, as 
Cambell puts it “On a Relational View, the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the 
room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic 
properties such as colour and shape  [emphasis added] and how they are arranged in relation to one another 
and to you.” (2002, p. 116) 
 
9 With the demise of phenomenalism, the realism-claim is rarely questioned in the contemporary analytic 
philosophy and often passes unnoticed in a debate which focuses on the directness-claim. However, the realism-
claim is much discussed in the context of heterodox representation-averse cognitive science, eg in “Non-
representationalist cognitive science and realism” (Zahidi, 2013).  
 
10 The nature of this correspondence will be a key issue in the discussion below.  
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there is little prospect of meeting the requirements of any job description which is consistent 
with the spirit of direct realism.  
2 Examining the candidate representations  
As Dretske, an advocate of the representationalist theory of consciousness puts it, the theory 
“never really gets out of the gate” unless we have a “plausible theory of original or natural 
representation that can put some flesh on these bones”, and he recognizes the difficulty of so 
doing. (2003, p. 74) Nevertheless Dretske does do some fleshing-out with respect to Issue 2: 
that is the relationship between representational content and phenomenal experience.  In 
particular, he addresses the question of what it is “about certain representations that makes 
the systems in which they occur conscious of what is being represented.” (Dretske, 1997, p. 
6) 
However, having granted Strong Representationalism, our concern is not with Issue 2, but 
with Issue 1 and particularly with the constraints on the representational content that the 
candidate representations can supply. Thus, we need to turn from representations in the 
abstract to consider particular examples thereof in order to understand what representations 
actually are, what they represent and how they represent. Indeed, Dretske notes that “we need 
to know what kind of representation the sensory representation is” and suggests that perhaps 
it is “like what Marr (1982) and his associates call a 2½-D sketch?” He continues, “Until 
these questions are answered, we can expect little progress on questions about the nature of 
perception itself.” (2004, p. 282) Similarly, Tye recognises that his own high level theory, 
PANIC (1997, p. 137), needs to be underpinned by an explanation of the mechanisms 
involved; Marr’s 2½-D sketch is again suggested as a candidate for consideration. (p. 210) 
Although mainstream cognitive science remains firmly wedded to the notion of 
representation11, since the early 1980s the focus of attention has shifted from Marr’s 
computational theory of vision to representations in neural networks and dynamical systems 
(Ramsey, 2001, p. 186). For this reason, and ease of explanation, we will examine a neural 
net which has been widely discussed in the context of object recognition and visual 
perception. The fundamental issues regarding the role of representations in a direct realist 
theory of perception are essentially unchanged from those arising in the earlier work and, we 
will argue, carry over into any plausible naturalistic extension thereof.  
Churchland (2002, p. 293) poses the question “How can neuronal activity represent 
something?” and offers an explanation in terms of “the vector/parameter space approach to 
representation”, which she illustrates using  a three layer artificial neural network, developed 
by Cottrell et al, that can perform recognition tasks on photographs of human faces.  For our 
 
11 This is not to say that all those working with neural nets and dynamical systems espouse the notion of 
representations. There is a representation-averse minority who, generally, argue for theories of direct perception. 
For example, Dreyfus draws on a non-representational understanding of neural nets in support of Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenological approach. (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 133) 
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purposes, the details12 of the network and the training are unimportant; there is no suggestion 
that this is how the human brain is actually structured. The key issue is the manner in which 
faces are represented at layer 2 in terms of cell activation levels which, in some sense, 
correspond to facial features. We need not be concerned with how this correspondence is 
achieved; Edelman (1998) discusses the same type of representations in terms of the 
activation levels of “tuned modules” rather than neural nets.  
 
Figure 1,  adapted from Churchland (2002, p. 292), 
relates to a simplified version of Cottrell’s network 
with three, rather than eighty, cells at layer two. The 
three cells are assumed to be activated at a level 
determined by mouth fullness (m), nose width (n) and 
eye separation (e).13 Thus any face presented to the 
network will activate the three cells at levels 
determined by the presence of those three features, 
and the state of the system can be defined by a three 
element vector (m,n,e) in abstract face-space. 
 
The utility of such a network for the purpose of face recognition is that similar faces are 
represented by nearby points in face-space, and dissimilar faces by distant points. Thus, if a 
previously unseen photograph is presented to the network, the face can be recognized by 
determining its nearest neighbor in face-space. Suppose a photograph showing a face with a 
full mouth and widely separated eyes but narrow nose is presented to the network. The face 
in this photograph would be represented by point X in face-space, and recognized as a 
photograph of face B by virtue of its proximity in face-space.    
 
Proximity in face-space can be given a precise meaning in terms of the “Euclidean distance” 
between, say, points p and q, that is sqrt((mp-mq)
2+(np-nq)
2+(ep-eq)
2). This measure can be 
extended to any number of dimensions in an abstract space. Thus  reasoning in terms of 
Euclidean distances in face-space can be used as the basis of inferences about the similarity 
of faces in physical space. Here is an example of what Swoyer calls “surrogate reasoning”, 
 
12 Churchland presents “the basic story” thus: “The values in the input vector [4096 components] reflect the 
gray-level values in the photographs, and the configuration of connection weights in the middle-layer vectors 
[80 components] embodies what is task-relevant in various aggregations of input values. Input vectors are 
pushed through the configuration of weights, transformed into abstract representations in a high dimensional 
“facial parameter space.” These vectors are in turn pushed through the last layer of weights with the resulting 
output vector [8 components] representing answers to “Is it a face or not?” “Is it a male or female?” and “Who is 
it?” (2002, p. 299) 
 
13 This is a simplification; the features are not humanly intuitively recognizable. Talk of nose width etc is purely 
illustrative. “Notice that each cell comprehends the entire surface of the input layer, rather than an isolated 
facial feature, such as the nose.”   (Churchland P. S., 2002, p. 298) 
 
Figure  1 
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that is “reasoning about a structural representation in order to draw inferences about what it 
represents” (1991, p. 452) 
3 Assessing the candidates for Role B (in the explanation of 
perceptually guided behaviour) 
Even these basic capabilities could provide an organism with important perceptually guided 
behaviours. Suppose type B faces are friends and type F faces are foes. Then on encountering 
a new face N, the appropriate behaviours could be initiated depending on the position of the 
corresponding points b, f and n in face-space. If n is closer to f than it is to b14, then N is more 
like F (foe) than B (friend); thus defensive action may be appropriate. Note that this piece of 
surrogate reasoning requires only that “the pattern of relations among the constituents of the 
represented phenomenon [the faces] is mirrored by the pattern of relation among the 
constituents of the representation itself [the points in abstract face-space].” (Swoyer, 1991, p. 
452) 
 
Here we are only scratching the surface with respect to the perceptually guided behaviours 
that could be initiated on the basis of such representations. Indeed a plausible evolutionary 
explanation of the development of such networks in the natural world might be given on the 
basis of the selection for such efficacious behaviours, building up from the simplest 
organisms through to the human brain with some 1011 neurons. (Churchland P. M., 2012, p. 
17) 
 
We grant that such representations could meet the requirements of Role B. Thus we do not 
need to challenge the claims of mainstream cognitive science. Moreover, we grant that such 
representations could provide the detail which is, as Dretske recognises, needed “to put some 
flesh on the bones” of a representational theory of consciousness (2003, p. 74).  
4 Assessing the candidates for Role A (in representationalist direct 
realism)  
The question remains with respect to Role A. That is whether the candidate representations 
can supply the representational content needed to meet the particularly onerous requirements 
of the representationalist version of direct realism. To address this question, we need to focus 
on the information available to the user of the representation, that is information available to 
the cognitive system within which the representation is instantiated.  
 
To facilitate this change of perspective, Figure 2a is redrawn from Figure 1 with two 
important changes.  Firstly, the objects in physical space and their representations in abstract 
face-space are shown separately, and their separation is emphasized by the dividing line. 
Secondly, the axes of the three dimensions in face-space have been re-labelled, for example, 
“cell x activation level” rather than “mouth fullness”. For our present purposes, the original 
 
14 That is ((mn-mb)2+(nn-nb)2 +(en-eb)2) < ((mn-mf)2+(nn-nf)2 +(en-ef)2) 
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labels would have been dangerously misleading with regard to the information available to 





The crucial issue, now evident in Figure 2a, is that there is no similarity between the points in 
abstract face-space and the corresponding faces in physical space; there is no similarity 
between point a and face A, or between point b and face B etc. Moreover, the points in face 
space do not provide any information about the properties of their targets, only information 
about the relationships between their targets.16 The information available in face-space, that is 
information encoded in the cell activation levels at layer 2, is in terms of the similarities and 
differences between faces A , B … H, not with respect to their properties.  
 
This fundamental lack of representational content with respect to the properties of the faces 
can be seen by considering the shapes shown in figure 2b. Although the faces A, B … H do 
not have any properties in common with the shapes A, B …H, they do share the same 
similarity and difference relationships. For example A is similar to C in terms of two 
properties and similar to G in terms of one property, and the same relationships hold between 
 
15 Labelling the axes “mouth fullness” etc, that is associating the firing rate of cell x with a particular property of 
faces, would require information that is only available outside the representation. Indeed labelling the axes 
would require a designer’s-eye view of both the target and its representation. 
 
16 Edelman makes the same point well by virtue of the stark simplicity of his figure showing a form of 
representation which “fulfills the requirement of second-order isomorphism…” (Edelman, 1998, p. fig 1) 
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A, C and G. (The properties mouth fullness, nose width and eye separation correspond to 
sidedness, shading and size respectively.) Here again, we can see why the representation 
cannot supply representational content which represents faces as having the properties that 
they (faces) actually have. The content is limited to that which is shared by the faces and the 
shapes, and they have no properties in common.17 
 
None of the above would be controversial within mainstream cognitive science. Indeed such 
representations in face-space would be characterised as “second-order isomorphic18” in 
accordance with the terminology introduced by Shepard and Chipman. That is:  
 
[a] second-order relationship between (a) the relations among alternative external 
objects, and (b) the relations among their corresponding internal representations. 
(1970, p. 2)   
O’Brien and Opie make explicit the lack of specificity with the respect to the properties of the 
targets of second-order isomorphic representations:  
…the two systems resemble each other with regard to their abstract relational 
organisation. …resemblance of this kind [second-order resemblance] is independent 
of first-order resemblance, in the sense that two systems can resemble each other at 
second-order without sharing properties. [emphasis added].  (2004, p. 8) 
    
Considering such second-order isomorphic representations, we conclude that although they 
might be well suited to Role B, they cannot meet the requirements of Role A: they cannot 
supply the representational content required of a representation in a direct realist theory of 
perception.  
 
At this point we maintain that representations instantiated in neural nets, which have been the 
focus of attention within the recent literature, cannot meet the requirements of direct realism. 
(We consider objections in the next section.) Nevertheless, it could be claimed that there are, 
or could be, other forms of representation which do meet such requirements. Indeed we have 
not yet considered Marr’s 2½-D sketch which, as we saw in §2, has been suggested as a 
potential candidate.  Marr’s computational theory of vision addresses the perceptual process 
 
17 Moreover, at the time of writing, the on-screen representation of the faces in the lower half figure 2a is also 
instantiated in the distribution of electric charges on RAM and the distribution of magnetic domains on hard 
drive. Thus the content of the representation is that which is common to these three different instantiations.  
 
18 The term “isomorphism” literally means equality or sameness (iso) of form (morphism). It is widely, though 
somewhat differently, used in a number of disciplines including mathematics and cognitive science, but also 
biology, geology and sociology. In maths isomorphism can be defined as: “A one-to-one correspondence 
between the elements of two sets such that the result of an operation on elements of one set corresponds to the 
result of the analogous operation on their images in the other set.” (Dictionary, 2016) The term is used more 
loosely in cognitive science, but the essential notion of a correspondence between the relationship between 
targets and the relationship between their representations, carries over in the case of second-order isomorphism.  
In maths, isomorphisms are by definition, in this sense, “second-order” and the distinction is not drawn. 
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at three levels19 and posits a sequence of three representations.20 However, although there are 
significant differences, we maintain that Marr’s 2 ½-D sketch is fundamentally, just as 
Churchland’s representation in “vector/parameter space”, an instance of second-order 
isomorphism and subject to the same constraints with respect to its representational content. 
As Bechtel and Shagrir (2015) point out, although Marr never discusses isomorphism 
explicitly, it is nonetheless an essential element of his theory.21   
 
It might be objected that the required representations (candidates for role A) are to be found 
at the personal-level, and that there are fairly detailed philosophical theories of how personal-
level states get their contents which we do not consider. However, such theories, eg PANIC 
(Tye, 1997) and Representational Naturalism (Dretske, 1988) (Dretske, 1997), are framed at 
too high a level of abstraction to address the question at issue: that is the nature of the 
relationship between the world and representation thereof and the consequent constraints on 
the type of representational content that can be provided. Moreover, as we noted in §2, both 
Tye and Dretske recognise the need to flesh-out their high level theory. 
 
It is certainly fair to say that the only representations that have, so far, been fleshed out in 
theories of visual perception are second-order isomorphic to their targets. We could go 
further to argue that the representations posited within any theory of visual perception, which 
is consistent with the naturalistic framework of mainstream cognitive science, cannot be other 
than second-order isomorphic.22 However, we do not need to press this point. Our argument 
against representationalist direct realism is unlikely to be questioned on the grounds that we 
have not examined all the candidate representations on offer within cognitive science or 
possible developments thereof, but, as we will see below, that the job description is too 
restrictive and the selection process is unfair. 
 
 
19 That is computational theory, representation and algorithm, and hardware implementation. (Marr, 1982, p. 25) 
 
20 Considering the three representations: the primal sketch, 2½-D sketch and 3-D model representation. The first 
is constructed from the pattern of stimulation on the retina, the second is a transformation of the first and the 
third of the second. The last of the three representations, the 3-D model representation, is designed for the 
purpose of object recognition. However, the 2½-D sketch, which serves as an intermediary in the construction of 
the 3-D model representation, appears to be the most likely candidate for role A, that is in Marr’s terminology 
an explanation of “pure perception” which is prior to “interpretation”. (Marr, 1982, p. 268) He describes the 2½-
D sketch as “an internal representation of objective physical reality that preceded the decomposition of the scene 
into “objects” and all the concomitant difficulties associated with object recognition.” (p. 269) 
 
21 “The gist of our interpretation is that Marr assumes implicitly that the visual system mirrors or preserves 
certain structural relations in the visual field. By structural relations we mean “high order” mathematical, 
geometrical, or other formal relations. The visual system would preserve these relations if there were an 
isomorphic mapping from the visual system onto the visual field…” (Bechtel & Shagrir, 2015, p. 314) 
 
22 As Obrien and Opie  put it in concluding a chapter on mental representations, “the structuralist theory of 
mental representations [is] mandatory for those philosophers of mind who think this discipline is answerable to 
cognitive science” (2004, p. 18). And second-order isomorphism is an essential feature of structural 
representations. 
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Although discussion is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to note that when direct 
perception is defended within cognitive science by Gibson23 and his avowedly-radical 
intellectual successors24 it is at the expense of rejecting representations. Within cognitive 
science, representations go hand in hand with theories of indirect perception. 
5 Addressing the objections and consolidating the argument 
It could be maintained that, whilst perception is indirect in the sense claimed by mainstream 
representationalist cognitive science, it is nonetheless direct in the sense of the 
representationalist direct realism of analytic philosophy. But peaceful coexistence would not 
do justice to the significance of the issues that are at stake.25 Such a resolution is in danger of 
reducing “direct realism” from a robust defence of our pre-critical intuitions of direct 
perceptual access to the world, to an insubstantial claim which stands independently of the 
perceptual process and the nature of the representations involved. 
Few if any philosophers with a serious interest in perception would now agree with Ryle that 
“what we [philosophers as opposed to “opticians, neuro-physiologists or psychologists”] are 
after is an account of how certain words work” (1953, p. 185). However, notwithstanding the 
demise of Linguistic Philosophy the vestiges of this demarcation are widespread in the 
literature. Armstrong, in his seminal defence of direct realism, takes issue with “some modern 
philosophers” who have taken “Direct Realism” to be true “but perfectly trivial”. (1961, p. 
xii) And, as a proponent of indirect realism, Smythies (1993) refers disparagingly to those 
direct realists who claim that they are “dealing with the ‘logic’ of perception which leads a 
life miraculously independent from the scientific account of how perception actually works.”   
 
Rejecting any such withdrawal into separate magisteria26, we take direct realism to be making 
a claim which is broadly in accordance with our pre-critical intuitions of direct perceptual 
access to the world and is, on this point, in conflict with mainstream cognitive science. 
Although there is often a reluctance to enter the fray, some do. For example, Bennett and 
Hacker give a robust response to Smythies’ call on the findings of neuroscience to support his 
objections to direct realism which they castigate as a “bad piece of seventeenth century 
metaphysics, which is not improved by a smattering of up to date neuroscientific discoveries 
about perception.” (2011, p. 249) And Searle defends direct realism against such objections 
on the grounds that they are based on “The Bad Argument” which held philosophers in thrall 
 
23 James J Gibson (1950) (1968) (1979)  
 
24 In “radical embodied cognitive science” (Chemero, 2009) (Hutto & Myin, 2012) and “ecological psychology” 
(Turvey, 2003) (Oytam & Neilson, 2007) 
 
25 As Noë and Thompson put it in the introduction to a collection of papers on the philosophy and science of 
perception, “It would be difficult to overstate the degree to which the problems dealt with by the writers in this 
book are alive and unresolved. …. what is at stake is ultimately one’s understanding of consciousness itself and 
one’s conception of one’s place in the natural world.” (2002, p. 12)  We find similar sentiments in Smith. 
Regarding the truth or falsity of direct realism, “The importance of the issue should now be clear. It involves 
nothing less than the choice between Realism and Idealism about the physical world.” (Smith, 2002, p. 17) 
 
26 In the sense of Gould’s non-overlapping magisteria. (1999) 
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from the seventeenth century until the middle of the last. (2015) (2018) Against this line of 
attack, we would defend the “seventeenth century metaphysics” in its opposition to direct 
realism and, moreover, maintain that it (the “metaphysics”) is improved by recent advances 
in cognitive science, notably with respect to the nature of the representations examined in §2.  
 
Indeed, the improvements are significant. They provide for an argument against direct 
realism which makes no reference to illusory or hallucinatory cases and, significantly for our 
purposes, does not draw on the disputed notion of an immediate object of awareness.27 The 
force of this improved argument is best seen in the context of Searle’s treatment of the 
“Argument from Science”.   
 
The scientist says we are trying to explain the cause of your visual experience and 
what we discovered is neurobiological processes cause a conscious visual experience. 
But then, surely, it seems that the visual experience is the object of your capacity of 
perception. It is what is seen. This last sentence embodies the mistake. … in the 
scientific case, there is indeed a perception, but the perception is not itself an object of 
perception. The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. (Searle, 
2018, p. 71) 
 
It would certainly be a mistake to objectify “your visual experience” as “the object of your 
capacity of perception”.  However, the conclusion of §4, that the representations posited by 
cognitive science cannot meet the requirements of direct realism, does not rest on any such 
objectification. The problem for the representationalist direct realist is that the “conscious 
visual experience”, however construed, cannot be an experience which, in any way, involves 
the properties of the physical object. No such representational content is available to be 
involved. As we saw in §4, notably in figure 2, second-order isomorphic representations 
represent relations between objects rather than properties of objects; they are silent with 
respect to the latter.   
 
We noted in §1 that, despite our efforts to be fair to their position, representationalist direct 
realists might question the terms of the job description. However, having examined the 
candidate representations, we maintain that they fall so far short of the requirements for a role 
within any theory of perception which remains true to the spirit of direct realism that there is 
little room for manoeuvre. The candidate representations, though they provide a basis for 
surrogate reasoning about their objects, cannot supply representational content which 
represents those objects as having any of the properties that they (those objects) actually 
have.  
 
In writing Job Description A, we drew on Dretske’s requirement that in normal perceptual 
conditions “objects have the properties they appear to have.” (1995, p. 602) However, it is 
not clear whether this requirement should be taken as applying to all, or to some, properties. 
 
27 Objections to this notion and the associated “Phenomenal Principle”  (Fish, 2010, p. 65)  (Robinson, 1994, p. 
32) are the mainstay of the representationalist/intentionalist defence of direct realism, and the motivation for 
Searle’s claim that “the great philosophers of the past” were led astray by “The Bad Argument”. (2015) (2018) 
 
Draft - A new objection to representationalist direct realism July 2020
   
 
 14  
 
We will grant that “direct realism” is sustainable, as a thesis of genuinely direct perception, 
on the latter interpretation. For example Logue requires only that perceptual experience 
“fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving things in her environment and some 
[emphasis added] of their properties”. (2012, p. 211) However, our argument in §4 shows 
that, in the case of putative representationalist direct realism, the requirement cannot be met 
for any properties.28 
“Direct realism” comes in many forms ranging from a thoroughgoing defence of our pre-
critical intuitions to the purely negative thesis that perception does not involve an “objectified 
appearance”29. Indeed a once substantial and controversial claim might be in danger of dying 
the death of a thousand qualifications.30  However, it would be seriously misleading to label 
any thesis, which did not involve perceiving things and at least some of their properties, as a 
theory of direct perception.31 Such a deflationary construal of “direct realism” would not do 
justice to the spirit of the thesis which has been at issue since the Early Moderns, was rejected 
until the middle of the last century, and is now defended within analytic philosophy. It would 
certainly not provide a defense of, as Brewer puts it, the “mind-independent physical objects 
we all know and love” (2004, p. 62) and a “commonsense realist worldview” (2007, p. 87). 
 
Defending “direct realism” on the basis of such a deflationary construal would be the 
equivalent of getting off a drink-driving charge on a legal technicality whilst admittedly 
drunk at the wheel. The verdict may be in accordance with statute, but we wouldn’t want the 
accused driving the school bus. Nor would we want a theory of direct perception which was 
acquitted on such legalistic grounds driving our worldview.  
 
6 Conclusion 
Although representationalist direct realism is widely supported within contemporary analytic 
philosophy, representations are taken to be the hallmark of indirect perception within 
cognitive science. Moreover, we have demonstrated that none of the representations which 
have been fleshed out in any detail or plausible developments thereof, though they may be 
 
28 So, it might be asked, what’s new? In response to Locke’s indirect realism Berkley argued that “an idea can 
be like nothing but an idea”, or as Armstrong puts it “there can be no resemblance between sense-impressions 
and physical objects.” (1961, p. 31) Indeed, this point is often directed against sense data theories. Such theories 
are taken to imply that “Of the physical object itself we would still know nothing except that it had no 
characteristics in common with the immediate objects of perception.” (p. 33) However, now the problem for the 
representationalist direct realist is that, according to our argument in §4, essentially the same sceptical 
conclusion arises independently of any reference to “sense-impressions” or “immediate objects of perception”. 
 
29 Le Morvan  talks of “Ur-Direct Realism“ as “nothing more than the thesis that we perceive physical objects 
without a logical prior awareness of an objectified appearance.” (2018, p. 131) 
 
30 In the same volume as above, targeting the concessions in Le Morvan’s much cited paper (Arguments Against 
Direct Realism and How to Counter Them, 2004), Kent asks “Is Direct Realism Falsifiable?” (2018, p. 33) 
 
31 Logue would characterize such a thesis as “Kantianism”, that is an account of perception according to which, 
in all cases, “phenomenal F-ness and instances of F-ness are radically dissimilar.” (2012, p. 233) 
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well suited to the explanation of perceptually guided behaviour, can supply the 
representational content required of a representation in a direct realist theory of perception.  
 
This conclusion would not have troubled the vast majority of philosophers who, until the 
middle of the last century, rejected direct realism as hopelessly naïve. Nor might it trouble 
today’s disjunctivist direct realists. Only representationalist direct realists need be concerned. 
However, given the importance of representationalism (aka intentionalism) in the late 
twentieth century rehabilitation of direct realism, our claim is highly significant.  
Paul H Griffiths – July 2020  
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